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Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in
the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than nonmembership. For example,
entry into a monetary union may cause a move from a non-indexation to an indexation
equilibrium. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an own monetary
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Asymmetric shocks play an important role in the theory of optimal currency areas. It is
a common hypothesis that macroeconomic variability will increase with the formation of
a monetary union because of the loss of national monetary policy as a stabilisation tool.
This aspect has featured prominently in the discussion on the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) in Europe. The eﬀects of asymmetric shocks in various monetary regimes
have recently been analysed by e.g. Coricelli et al. (2000) and Lane (2000) in models
with nominal wage rigidity. A key issue is, however, how monetary union will aﬀect the
incentives for other adjustment mechanisms that can substitute for national monetary
policy. We analyse whether increased nominal wage ﬂexibility can play such a role. More
precisely, we ask the conditional question: if membership in a monetary union tends
to increase macroeconomic variability, to what extent will nominal wages become more
ﬂexible? This issue has so far been dealt with mainly in reduced-form models of labour
market reform (see e.g. Sibert and Sutherland, 2000; Calmfors, 2001; or Bentolila and
Saint-Paul, 2001).
Our starting point is that the need for stabilisation policy arises from wage inﬂexibility.
There are several ways of thinking about such rigidity. A ﬁrst set of explanations em-
phasises general diﬃculties of changing nominal wages: the reasons may be social norms
against wage cuts (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Bewley, 1998), menu costs (Blanchard and
Kioyotaki, 1987; Ball and Romer, 1991), that past nominal wage levels act as fall-back
positions in new bargaining (Holden, 1997) or that insiders have a small interest in wage
ﬂexibility, as employment variations fall largely on outsiders (Gottfries, 1992). A second
approach stresses the existence of predetermined contract periods, the length of which
depends on a trade-oﬀ between contract and variability costs (Gray, 1978; Ball, 1987). A
third approach focuses on the incentives for contingent rules, viz. indexation, as a way
to achieve nominal wage ﬂexibility during contract periods (Gray, 1976; Blanchard 1979;
Ball, 1988).
Our interest is in how monetary union is likely to aﬀect nominal wage ﬂexibility in a
setting like the European one, where it may be reasonable to assume that there are no se-
rious problems of inﬂation bias because central banks have been made independent. The
focus is on how monetary union (subsequently EMU for short) aﬀects the incentives to
index wages, but we also analyse the eﬀect on contract length. As diﬀerent types of nomi-
nal wage rigidity depend on similar factor s ,t h i sa n a l y s i sh i g h l i g h t sh o ww a g eﬂexibility in
general is likely to be inﬂuenced. But the analysis of wage indexation and contract length
1is also interesting in its own right, as we want to understand in general which conditions
are conducive to various contract arrangements. For example, in the 1980s and early
1990s, indexation schemes were abolished in some European countries. One important
question is whether the EMU might reverse this trend. This possibility is suggested by
the fact that indexation clauses have become more common in Spain and reintroduced
in Finland after these countries joined the EMU (OECD, 2001; Inkomstpolitiskt avtal,
2001). Also, two other EMU members, Belgium and Luxemburg, never abolished their
earlier indexation schemes.
The theory of wage indexation originated with Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977). It has
focused on the incentives to stabilise employment. With nominal demand shocks, wage
setters prefer full indexation, as this stabili s e st h er e a lw a g ea n dt h u sa l s oe m p l o y m e n t .I n
the case of real supply shocks, wage setters want lower indexation, possibly zero, because
this leads to real wage changes that completely oﬀset the direct employment eﬀects of
the shocks. When both types of shocks occur, partial indexation is optimal. Other work
raised the possibility of ﬁxed costs of indexation, which might imply that the stabilisation
gains are not large enough to motivate indexation (Gray, 1978; Ball, 1988). Some of the
work has also emphasised the similarity between the problem of choosing the degree of
indexation and that of choosing contract length (Gray, 1978; Ball, 1988).
Later work by e.g.Van Hoose and Waller (1991), Ball and Cecchetti (1991), Waller and
Van Hoose (1992), Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Walsh (1995), Hutchison and Walsh (1998), and
Heinemann (1999) has analysed the interaction between wage indexation and monetary
policy. The earlier insight that the incentives for wage indexation are weaker the larger
is supply-side variability remains. This may help explain the abolishment of earlier in-
dexation schemes in some European countries in the 1980s, after they were hit by serious
supply shocks.
Most of the literature has modelled closed economies, although there are exceptions,
such as Flood and Marion (1982), Aizenman (1985), Aizenman and Frenkel (1995), and
Bryson et al. (1998). Leichter (1998) analysed the impact of monetary union on the
incentives for indexation and concluded that they would be strengthened. The reason is
that a common monetary policy does not stabilise country-speciﬁc supply shocks; hence
the cost of indexation in terms of reducing the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to sta-
bilise supply shocks becomes lower. The analysis assumes that all countries produce a
homogenous good, so that no real exchange rate changes occur.
We develop the open-economy aspects of the analysis of nominal wage ﬂexibility by
explicitly distinguishing between three rather than two types of shocks: real supply, real
2demand and nominal exchange rate shocks.1 This richer modelling of shocks is important
for a proper comparison between membership and non-membership in a monetary union.
We also emphasise the objective of stabilising the real consumption wage more than is
usually done.2
A key conclusion is that EMU membership strengthens the incentives for wage in-
dexation. In the presence of indexation costs, wage setters may choose non-indexation
outside the EMU but indexation inside. Similarly, EMU membership reduces contract
length. But more nominal wage ﬂexibility inside than outside the EMU is at best an
imperfect substitute for a national monetary policy. Increased nominal wage ﬂexibility
may even be socially undesirable: although employment and real wage variability is re-
duced, the welfare gain from this could be outweighed by the welfare loss from more price
variability. Socially optimal indexation is always lower than equilibrium indexation in our
model. Hence, the more centralised the decisions on indexation, the less likely it is. This
conclusion squares well with the fact that the abolishment of indexation in, for example
Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, was associated with government interventions.
A novel feature of our analysis is that there are multiple indexation equilibria under
some circumstances, whereas there is only a unique full-indexation equilibria under other
circumstances.
Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 derives equilibrium indexation inside and
outside the EMU in the absence of indexation costs. Section 4 analyses the likelihood
of indexation versus non-indexation equilibria when there are indexation costs. Section
5 discusses the social welfare consequences of indexation. Section 6 shows that contract
length can be analysed in a similar way as indexation. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We employ a stylized model of a small open economy, which produces a domestic good
and consumes both this domestic good and a foreign good. The foreign-currency price
of the foreign good is exogenous. As our interest is in how asymmetric shocks aﬀect
wage setting, we neglect common shocks and focus on domestic productivity and demand
shocks, as well as on exchange rate shocks (which only occur when the economy is outside
1Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2001) analysed inter alia how nominal wage ﬂexibility is aﬀected by EMU
membership, but their results are hard to interpret because no distinction is made between nominal
exchange rate and real demand shocks.
2Ball and Cecchetti (1991), Milesi-Feretti (1994), Hutchison and Walsh (1998), and Heinemann (1999)
do, however, analyse real-wage objectives as well.
3the EMU).
The model has the following time structure. Wage contracts are concluded before the
realisations of all shocks. Outside the EMU, the domestic central bank acts after demand
and supply shocks, but before exchange rate shocks. These assumptions ensure that there
is scope for stabilisation policy at the same time as they allow for exchange rate volatility
that cannot be countered by monetary policy.
2.1 The structure of the economy
Output is produced by a continuum of identical perfectly competitive ﬁrms indexed on
the interval [0, 1]. Firm i has a Cobb-Douglas production function
yi = ali + θ, (1)
where yi is output, li is employment, θ is a productivity shock, which is common to all
ﬁrms, and 0 <a<1 is the elasticity of output with respect to employment. All lower-case
variables are logs.




(wi − p − lna − θ), (2)
where wi is the nominal wage in the ﬁrm and p is the price of the domestic good.
A wage contract in a ﬁrm has two components. It determines: (i)an o m i n a lb a s ew a g e
wi0;a n d( ii)a ni n d e x a t i o np a r a m e t e r ,bi, which indexes the nominal wage to unexpected
changes in the consumer price index (CPI), pc.T h i sg i v e s
wi = wi0 + bi (pc − p
e
c), (3)
where the e superscript indicates expected variables. It is well-known that, in the absence
of contract costs, such a wage contract is not optimal: the ﬁrst-best solution would be to
index wages to the shocks themselves (Blanchard, 1979). However, real-world contingent
contracts usually have the above form. A plausible reason is that indexation to the CPI
may oﬀer a second-best solution: contract costs are held down because of the simplicity
of the indexation scheme and because CPI changes are easy to verify.3
3Because of its theoretical underpinnings as a measure of the cost of living, the CPI is widely regarded
as the most reliable price index. Substantial resources are usually invested in the construction of it, and
in many countries there are formalised procedures for how the decisions on index numbers should be
taken (often in speciﬁc index boards).









A local wage setter thus wants to minimise the ﬂuctuations of employment and the real
consumption wage around target levels, which we set to zero for employment and to φ for
the real consumption wage. Wage setters also experience disutility from variations in the
CPI.4 γ and λ are the relative weights for real wage and price variability, respectively.
Aggregate supply is yS =
1 R
0
yidi. Aggregate demand for the domestic good, yD, depends
on the real exchange rate, e−p,w h e r ee is the nominal exchange rate, and on a stochastic
real demand shock, v. β is the elasticity of demand for domestic goods with respect to
the real exchange rate. Hence, we have:
y
D = β (e − p)+v. (5)
The CPI is
pc = αp +( 1− α)e, (6)
where α is the weight of domestic goods in consumption.
Outside the EMU, monetary policy is set by the domestic central bank. Like Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (2001), we assume that the intermediate target of the central bank is the
exchange rate. The bank tries to achieve an exchange rate that minimises its loss function.
But the actual exchange rate varies around the desired level due to exchange rate shocks.
We thus have
e = e
CB + ξ, (7)
where eCB is the desired exchange rate for the central bank, which we shall refer to as its
”policy instrument”, and ξ is a nominal shock. The central bank has the loss function
L








lidi and l∗ is the bank’s employment target. We set l∗ = le, i.e. the bank’s
employment target is equal to the expected employment level. This rules out any inﬂa-
tion bias of monetary policy, which we ﬁnd a reasonable characteristic of central bank
b e h a v i o u ri nt o d a y ’ sW e s t e r nE u r o p e .




4If we set the preceding period’s CPI level to zero, our formulation is equivalent to entering inﬂation
into the loss function.
52.2 Price determination
By equating aggregate supply and demand, and using the wage formula (3), we obtain:
p =
(1 − a)β
a + β (1 − a)
e +
a
a + β (1 − a)
(w0 − lna)+
ab






a + β (1 − a)
v −
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wi0di is the aggregate base wage and b =
1 R
0
bidi is aggregate indexation.




(1 − α)a +( 1− a)β




a + β (1 − a) − abα
−
αθ
a + β (1 − a) − abα
. (10)
2.3 Monetary policy
Inside the EMU, the exchange rate is irrevocably ﬁxed and assumed to equal the expected
exchange rate outside the EMU. Outside the EMU, the central bank sets its monetary
policy instrument eCB so as to minimise the expectation of the loss function (8) subject
to (2), (3), (6), (7), (9), (10) and the deﬁnitions of w0,b,and l. When the bank acts, it
knows the realisations of w0, b, θ and v, and responds to them in a discretionary way.5
From the FOC we can derive the policy response function of the central bank:
e
CB = q + Hθ + Kv, (11)
where q is an uninteresting constant and H and K are given in Appendix A.1. H and
K cannot be unambigously signed, but for all the parameter values we use H>0a n d
K<0.
Consider ﬁrst a negative demand shock. K<0 then implies that monetary policy is
eased with the aim of depreciating the currency. This can be understood as follows. With
a constant exchange rate, the output price fa l l s .T h i sc a u s e sb o t he m p l o y m e n ta n dt h e
CPI to fall. The bank responds by easing monetary policy. The optimal response is to
limit the fall in employment by allowing a rise in the CPI.
Consider then a negative supply shock. H>0 then implies that monetary policy is
tightened in order to appreciate the currency. The eﬀects on employment and the CPI
5The assumption is thus that the bank cannot precommit to a policy rule, which would allow it to act
as a Stackelberg leader, taking the responses of wage setters into account.
6depends on parameter values. If β is suﬃciently large, the optimal response of the bank
is to allow a rise in the CPI and a fall in employment in this case, too.6
3 Wage decisions with no indexation costs
3.1 EMU membership
We ﬁrst analyse wage contracts with EMU membership. We look at a symmetric Nash
equilibrium where each local wage setter chooses wi0 and bi, taking the aggregate base
wage, w0, and aggregate indexation, b, as given. The optimisation is made by minimising
the expectation of (4) subject to (2), (3), (6), (9), (10) and the assumption that e = ee = q.
Note that inﬂation considerations do not matter for indexation, because the path of the




(1 − a)+γα(1 − a)
3´
σ1 + γα(1 − a)
α +
³
α(1 − a)+γα(1 − a)
3´
σ1 + γα(1 − a)
, (12)
where σ1 = σ2
v/σ2
θ is the ratio between the variance of the demand shock and the variance
of the supply shock.
Equation (12) shows the standard property that an increase in the relative variability of
demand, σ1, increases indexation. This follows from t h eo bj e c t i v et os t a b i l i s ee m p l o y m e n t .
Consider the extreme case when α = 1 (only domestic goods are consumed), β =1( a
unitary elasticity of demand with respect to the real exchange rate), and γ =0( w a g e
setters do not care about the real consumption wage). Then b =( 1−a)σ1/(1+(1−a)σ1),
which is the expression for a closed economy derived by Gray (1976). Hence b =0 ,i f
there are only supply shocks (σ2
v = 0). In this case, according to (9), dp = −dθ.A s
employment in each ﬁrm depends on wi − p − θ, a supply shock hence causes a change
in the real product wage, wi − p, that exactly oﬀsets the direct employment eﬀect of the
shock. With only demand shocks (σ2
θ =0 ) ,b = 1: in this case equally large price and
wage changes keep the real product wage, and thus also employment, constant. When
there are both types of shocks, there is partial indexation.
In the general case when 0 < α < 1, β > 0a n dγ > 0, we have that (1 − β)/α ≤
b ≤ 1/α. Some indexation is then optimal also if there are only supply shocks.7 As b =1
stabilises the real consumption wage completely, indexation is closer to unity, the larger
6The precise condition is β > 1−α. See Van Hoose and Waller (1991), Waller and Van Hoose (1992),
Walsh (1995), Hutchison and Walsh (1998), and Leichter (1998) for similar analyses.
7If β > 1, the optimal indexation could be negative.
7the weight for the real wage, γ. Indexation may also be greater than unity. This happens
with a small weight for the real wage and large relative demand variability. The reason
is that domestic output makes up only part of the CPI. If a demand shock raises the
output price by one percent, the percentage rise of the CPI is α; hence the indexation
parameter must be 1/α if the money wage is also to rise by one percent so as to leave the
real product wage constant.
3 . 2 N o n - m e m b e r s h i pi nt h eE M U
As in the EMU case, each wage setter sets wi0 and bi so as to minimise the expectation
of (4). But wage setters now also take the domestic central bank’s response function (11)
and the possibility of exchange rate shocks into account. The FOCs now give:
bi =
A + Bσ1 + Cσ2 ³
1+γ (1 − a)
2´
(D + Eσ1 + Fσ2)
+
γ (1 − a)
2
1+γ (1 − a)
2 = f (b), (13)
where in addition to earlier explained symbols σ2 = σ2
ξ/σ2
θ. A, B, C, D, E, and F are
all functions of b a n da r eg i v e ni nA p p e n d i xA . 2 .
Setting bi = b in (13) gives an equation for aggregate indexation. Indexation now
depends on the relative importance of the three shocks: the ratio between the variances
of the demand and the supply shocks, σ1, and the ratio between the variances of the
exchange rate and supply shocks, σ2. The equation for aggregate indexation is a ﬁfth-
degree polynomial in b. Two possible sets of solutions are illustrated in Figure 1 by the






Figure 1: Equilibrium indexation inside the EMU
Curve I illustrates a case with three equilibria: there is then usually one with 0 <b<1,
always one with b = 1, and usually one with b>1. Curve II shows a case where b =1i s
8the only equilibrium. The b = 1 equilibrium can be explained as follows. With b =1 ,t h e
central bank cannot aﬀect the real product wage, w−p,a sa ne x c h a n g er a t ec h a n g el e a d s
to equal changes in the output price and the money wage. This makes the bank unable
to inﬂuence employment. The best it can do is then to focus solely on price stability.
Hence, the central bank oﬀsets completely all eﬀects on the CPI of real demand and
supply shocks. All variations in the CPI are th e r e f o r ed u et oe x c h a n g er a t es h o c k s .M o r e
precisely pc = ξ, as shown in Appendix A.3. b = 1 is a Nash equilibrium because the best
response of each local wage setter is then to set bi = 1, as this insulates both the real
consumption wage and employment from exchange rate shocks. This does not stabilise
employment in the case of demand or supply shocks, but there is no point in trying to do
so through indexation, as these shocks do not move the CPI.8
With curve I, the 0 <b<1a n d b>1 equilibria in Figure 1 are both (dynamically)
stable, whereas the b = 1 equilibrium is unstable.9 In these cases, social welfare is the
highest in the 0 <b<1 equilibrium. When there is only one equilibrium with b =1 ,a s
with curve II, this equilibrium is always stable.
3.3 Numerical examples
As general analytical results are diﬃcult to derive, we resort to numerical examples.
Throughout, we assume a = α =0 .7, which are relevant values for most EU countries
(Walsh, 1995; Walsh and Hutchison, 1998; Lane, 2001). We set β =0 .5i nm o s te x a m -
ples, which is consistent with conventional estimates of export and import elasticities, as
reported in e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld (2000),10 but we also report computations with
β = 1 as an example of a possible future situation with more integrated markets than
today. As to λ, Broadbent and Barro (1997) found a weight of inﬂa t i o ni nt h ec e n t r a l
bank’s loss function of 3. We regard lower values of λ as more plausible, as we ﬁnd it
hard to believe in such a high weight on price stability in a credible low-inﬂation regime
such as we have assumed.11 However, we vary λ b e t w e e n1a n d3i no u re x a m p l e s .
8The possibilities of multiple equilibria and a single b = 1 equilibrium are not speciﬁct oo u ro p e n
economy model. Similar results are obtained in closed-economy models with an optimising central bank
if there is a nominal shock that policy cannot counter. This has not been recognised generally. See,
however, Heinemann (1999) for an exception.
9Stability is then deﬁned as local stability around the equilibrium if we impose a dynamic adjustment
process according to which
.
bi= φ(f(b)−bi), where φ > 0. A necessary condition for such stability is that
the f(b)-curve is less sloped than the 45-degree line around the equilibrium.
10With export and import shares in GDP of 0.3, export and import elasticities of 0.8 correspond to
β =0 .48. β =0 .5 is also the assumption made in Lane (2000).
11If the employment goal equals equilibrium employment, so that there is no inﬂation bias, then there
is no reason to appoint a conservative central banker in the Rogoﬀ (1985) sense. One should then expect
9As to the weight of the real wage in the wage setters’ loss functions, γ =1i so u r
main assumption, but we also experiment with larger weights. We look at several shock
patterns, but they are all chosen so as to give larger macroeconomic variability inside
the EMU than outside when nominal wages are rigid (zero indexation), so that there is
a potential stabilisation cost of EMU membership.12 In our tables, the three shocks have
equal variances in the ﬁrst row. In the second row, the variance of the supply shock is
twice the variance of the other shocks. In the third row, the variance of the demand
s h o c ki st w i c et h ev a r i a n c eo ft h eo t h e rs h o c k s, and in the fourth row the variance of the
exchange rate shock is twice the variance of the other shocks.
Tables 1 and 2 give equilibrium indexation under various assumptions. When there
are multiple equilibria outside the EMU, we focus on the partial-indexation equilibrium.
This is regarded as a focal point both because it has reasonable characteristics (stability
and the highest social welfare) and because partial indexation schemes have been the most
common in practice. In a few cases, there are deviations from the described pattern. We
then report the stable equilibrium with the lowest indexation, which is also the one with
the highest social welfare.
Inside the EMU Outside the EMUa
β =1 β =0 .5 β =1 β =0 .5
Variances λ =1 λ =2 λ =3 λ =1 λ =2 λ =3
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.46 0.90 0.52 0.57c 1b 0.54c 1b 1b
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.36 0.85 0.34 0.24 0.21 0.37 1b 1b
σ1 =2 ,σ2 =1 0.62 0.99 0.48 0.48 1b 0.25 0.19c 1b
σ1 =1 ,σ2 =2 0.46 0.90 0.79c 1b 1b 1b 1b 1b
a) Unless stated otherwise there are three equilibria: 0 < b < 1, b = 1 and b > 1. The table gives the
    stable equilibrium with the lowest indexation.
b) This is the only equilibrium. It is stable.
c) There are three equilibria: two with 0 < b < 1 and one with b = 1.
Table 1: Equilibrium indexation when γ =1
t h ew e i g h to fi n ﬂation in the central bank’s preference function to equal the ”true” social weight.
12See Section 5. Canzoneri et al. (1996) and Artis and Ehrman (2000) ﬁnd nominal shocks to be the
main determinant of exchange rate variability, whearas Clarida and Gali (1994) and Thomas (1997) ﬁnd
real shocks, especially demand shocks, to be important as well. Most studies agree that nominal (exchange
rate) shocks are unimportant for relative output variability among countries, which is instead explained
by real shocks, with supply shocks being the most important. Our assumptions are a compromise between
the diﬀering empirical results on relative output and exchange rate variability (see Section 8). Note that
we have normalised nominal shocks to zero in the case of EMU membership. We have thus assumed away
the possibilities of both monetary control errors by the ECB and exchange rate shocks vis-` a-vis third
countries. The real-world counterpart to exchange rate shocks in our model is thus the ”net diﬀerence in
nominal shocks” between non-membership and membership.
10Inside the EMU Outside the EMUa
γ =1 γ =2 γ =3 γ =1 γ =2 γ =3
Variances λ =1 , 2, 3 λ =1 , 2, 3 λ =1 , 2, 3 λ =1 λ =2 λ =3 λ =1 λ =2 , 3 λ =1 , 2, 3
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.54 1b 1b 1b 1b 1b
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.37 1b 1b 0.53c 1b 1b
σ1 =2, σ2 =1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.25 0.19 1b 0.42 1b 1b
σ1 =1, σ2 =2 0.90 091 0.93 1b 1b 1b 1b 1b 1b
a) Unless stated otherwise there are three equilibria: 0 < b < 1, b = 1 and b > 1. The table gives the
    stable equilibrium with the lowest indexation.
b) This is the only equilibrium. It is stable.
c) There are three equilibria: two with 0 < b < 1 and one with b = 1.
Table 2: Equilibrium indexation when β =0 .5
Inside the EMU, indexation is always partial. When β = 1, indexation is around 0.5,
but in our main case with β =0 .5 it is always close to unity. Outside the EMU, there
are sometimes multiple equilibria and sometimes only one full-indexation equilibrium.
The b = 1 equilibria are more common when (i) exchange rate shocks are large (as full
indexation is the optimal response to such shocks); (ii) the central bank’s weight on
inﬂation, λ, is high (because exchange rate shocks are relatively more important when
the central bank stabilises the CPI to a large extent in the case of demand and supply
shocks), and (iii) the wage setters’ weight on the real consumption wage, γ,i sh i g h( a s
stabilisation of the real consumption wage requires full indexation).
When there is partial indexation outside the EMU, larger exchange rate shocks push
indexation closer to unity. Increases in both supply and demand variability (compare
rows 2 and 3 with row 1) reduce indexation outside the EMU if it is partial. The result
for supply variability is standard, whereas the result for demand variability is not. But
the explanation is similar. Take the cases of negative supply or demand shocks. With
a constant nominal wage, the CPI rises and employment falls in both cases (see Section
2.3). So, to the extent that a wage setter wants to stabilise employment, there is an
incentive to reduce the nominal wage. This requires negative indexation. Larger supply
and demand shocks enhance this incentive.
Whether or not indexation is higher inside the EMU than outside depends on the
equilibrium outside. With partial indexation outside, indexation is usually higher inside
than outside the EMU. The explanation is that both demand and supply variability give
a motive for negative indexation outside the EMU, as discussed above. But with full
indexation outside the EMU, indexation is lower inside in our examples.
114 Indexation in the presence of ﬁxed costs
So far, we have assumed indexation always to occur. A more realistic assumption is that
indexation takes place only when the gains exceed some threshold. Following Gray (1978),
Ball (1988), and Ball and Cechetti (1991), we shall assume a ﬁxed cost of indexation, which
depends on the existence of such arrangements per se, but is unrelated to the amount of
indexation.
This cost can be thought of as being associated with the complexity of an indexation
scheme as compared to an ordinary nominal wage contract. The cost may arise because
of the psychological eﬀort of computing optimal indexation formulas (as the authors of
this article can verify), the eﬀort of learning about the values of the parameters in such
formulas, the diﬃculties of agreeing among employees on the degree of indexation, and the
diﬃculties of negotiating the indexation arrangements with employers. Also, indexation
arrangements usually increase the frequency of wage adjustments, so there are likely to
be larger menu costs of wage changes (Ball and Cechetti, 1991).
Another possibility has to do not with indexation per se, but with the general cost
of changing wage contracting arrangements, which tend to show a high degree of inertia
(Traxler et al., 2001). If there have been no indexation arrangements, there may be a
large cost of introducing them, because this requires a consensus on the need to change
the design of contracts. This may be particularly diﬃcult to achieve in those countries
that, after a drawn-out process in the 1980s, dismantled such arrangements in response
to earlier supply shocks.
When deciding whether or not to index, each wage setter compares the stabilisation
gain with the cost. The anticipated gain depends on the expectation of what other wage
setters will do: as indexation elsewhere increases price variability, each wage setter’s
gain from indexation is increasing in aggregate indexation (indexation arrangements are
strategic complements). We analyse this in a way that is similar to the Ball and Romer
(1991) model of how menu costs and coordination failures may interact to produce nominal
wage rigidity in non-indexed contracts.13
We ﬁrst compute the expected losses for an individual wage setter of not indexing
and indexing, respectively, under the assumption that aggregate indexation is zero. The
diﬀerence between these losses is the wage setter’s stabilisation gain from indexation when
others do not index, ∆EL0. We then compute the expected losses for an individual wage
setter of not indexing and indexing, respectively, under the assumption that aggregate
13Ball and Romer (1991) did not analyse indexation formally, but noted the analogy to the problem
they discussed.
12indexation is at the equilibrium level. The diﬀerence between theses losses is the stabili-
sation gain from indexation when others index, ∆ELb. The calculations are described in
Appendix B.
We assume a uniform indexation cost, F.I f ∆EL0 >F , it always pays for each
wage setter to index. The economy then ends up in an indexation equilibrium. If instead
∆ELb <F, it never pays for an individual wage setter to index. Then the economy ends
up with zero indexation. If ∆EL0 <F<∆ELb, two equilibria are possible. If each wage
setter expects others not to index, it is optimal not to index oneself, and the equilibrium
implies zero indexation. If each wage setter expects all others to index, it is optimal to
index oneself, and the outcome is an indexation equilibrium.
Table 3 gives ∆EL0 and ∆ELb inside and outside the EMU, respectively, when β =0 .5
and γ = 1. When there are three equilibria outside the EMU, we show the same case as
in Table 2. The losses are normalised by setting σ2
v = σ2
θ = σ2
ξ =1i nr o w1 .I nall cases
shown, the expected gains from indexation are larger inside the EMU than outside. This
can be shown to hold also for all the other cases in Tables 1 and 2.14
Outside Inside Outside Inside
Variances Others do not index Others index
λ =1
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.10 1.23 2.04 31.82
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.06 1.84 1.03 47.40
σ1 =2 ,σ2 =1 0.03 1.95 0.50 50.44
σ1 =1 ,σ2 =2 0.41 1.23 24.22 31.82
λ =2
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.08 1.23 12.11 31.82
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.04 1.84 12.11 47.40
σ1 =2 ,σ2 =1 0.01 1.95 0.19 50.44
σ1 =1 ,σ2 =2 0.41 1.23 24.22 31.82
λ =3
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.08 1.23 12.11 31.82
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.04 1.84 12.11 47.40
σ1 =2 ,σ2 =1 0.01 1.95 12.11 50.44
σ1 =1 ,σ2 =2 0.44 1.23 24.22 31.82
Table 3: The expected gain of indexation for an individual wage setter
It is intuitive that the gains from indexation are larger inside than outside the EMU
when equilibrium indexation in the absence of ﬁxed costs is higher. It is less obvious
14The conclusion holds also if we look at the other equilibria outside the EMU than the partial-
indexation equilibria when there are multiple equilibria.
13why the gains are larger when equilibrium indexation inside is partial but full outside.
However, the explanation is this. In the EMU, each wage setter chooses indexation to
minimise employment and real wage variability arising from both demand and supply
shocks. Hence, the gain of indexation is ”large”. Outside the EMU, (the full) indexation
only protects against the employment and real wage instability caused by exchange rate
shocks. Because the central bank then does not allow demand and supply shocks to
aﬀect the CPI, there is no need to stabilise the real wage through indexation against
these shocks, and there is no point in trying to stabilise employment this way. Therefore,
indexation outside the EMU gives only a ”small” stabilisation gain.
The incentives to index are thus stronger inside than outside the EMU. This raises the
possibility of a non-indexation equilibrium outside the EMU, but an indexation equilib-
rium inside. An economy joining the EMU migh tt h e r e f o r em o v ef r o mn o n - i n d e x a t i o nt o
indexation. This presupposes that the indexa t i o nc o s ti sh i g he n o u g ht op r e v e n ti n d e x a -
tion outside the EMU, but not high enough to prevent the larger gains from indexation
inside the EMU to tilt the balance.
To reverse the result that indexation incentives are stronger inside than outside the
EMU, exchange rate shocks must be much larger than in our examples. We experimented
with increasing the size of these shocks to the values where the expected social welfare
is the same inside and outside the EMU when wages are rigid, so that there would be
no potential stabilisation cost of EMU membership (see Section 5.1). At these cut-oﬀ
points, the stabilisation gains for each wage setter of indexing are still larger inside than
outside the EMU when others are expected not to index, whereas the reverse holds when
others are expected to do so. As the former case is the most relevant one when analysing
a possible move from non-indexation to indexation, this sensitivity analysis seems rather
to support our conclusions.
5S o c i a l w e l f a r e
Table 4 reports how macroeconomic variability diﬀe r sa m o n gv a r i o u sc a s e sd e p e n d i n go n
whether indexation is chosen or not. We evaluate the social losses by aggregating the
loss functions of wage setters. Columns 1 and 2 give the losses with zero indexation, and
columns 3 and 4 the losses (gross of indexation costs) with indexation. We show the cases




Variances Inside Outside Inside Outside
σ1 = σ2 =1 3.21 1.27 4.17 1.37
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 4.91 1.45 6.53 1.50
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 4.71 1.67 5.98 1.70
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 3.21 1.98 4.17 3.00
Employment variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 1.73 0.46 0.92 0.66
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 2.08 0.50 0.97 0.65
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 3.11 0.54 1.70 0.65
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 1.73 0.81 0.92 1.00
CPI variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.74 0.40 3.22 0.58
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 1.42 0.47 5.43 0.61
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 0.80 0.56 4.29 0.67
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 0.74 0.58 3.22 2.00
Real wage variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.74 0.40 0.03 0.12
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 1.42 0.47 0.12 0.24
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 0.80 0.56 0.0009 0.38
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 0.74 0.58 0.03 0
Table 4: The social loss and macroeconomic variability (β =0 .5, λ =1 ,a n dγ =1 )
Columns 1 and 2, show that the social loss is larger inside the EMU than outside when
wages are rigid. This reﬂects greater variability in all the three goal variables, although
the diﬀerence is particularly large for employment. This diﬀerence in social welfare is the
standard stabilisation cost of joining a monetary union.16
If wages are indexed inside the EMU but not indexed outside, the proper welfare
comparison between membership and non-membership involves columns 2 and 3. The
table shows that indexation inside the EMU increases the diﬀerence in social welfare (also
when neglecting indexation costs). This is so because the social loss in the EMU is always
larger with indexation than without. Indexation in the EMU reduces both employment
15The computation formulas are reported in Calmfors and Johansson (2002). The calculations assume
φ =l na.L e t t i n gφ 6=l na would add a constant to all expected values, but not aﬀect the comparisons.
16Social welfare is deﬁned in the narrow sense of the welfare associated with macroeconomic variability.
We do not take into account the eﬃciency gains from a common currency, which might outweigh the
stabilisation costs (see e.g. Calmfors et al., 1997). For there to be a welfare gain of EMU membership in
our model in the non-indexation case, exchange rate variability must be quite large. The cut-oﬀ values
for σ2 are 3.75 for σ1 =1 , 5.91 for σ1 =1 /2, and 5.33 for σ1 =2 .
15Inside Outside
Variances SO EI SO EI
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.41 0.90 0.15 0.54
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 0.35 0.85 0.07 0.37
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 0.52 0.99 -0.005 0.25
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 0.41 0.90 0.31 1
SO = socially optimal indexation, EI = equilibrium indexation.
The equilibrium levels of indexation are taken from Table 1.
Table 5: Socially optimal and equilibrium indexation levels (β =0 .5, λ =1 ,a n dγ =1 )
and real wage variability, but it increases price variability even more. If indexation in the
EMU is to reduce the social loss, one has to assume either λ:s (the weight on inﬂation) that
are considerably below unity (0.60 for equal supply and demand variability, 0.61 for large
supply variability and 0.64 for large demand variability, if γ =1 )o rγ:s (the weight on real
wages) that are considerably above unity (2.59 for equal supply and demand variability,
2.56 for large supply variability, and 2.64 for large demand variability, if λ =1 ) . B u t
in these cases, too, welfare is lower inside than outside the EMU, so a move from non-
indexation to indexation is at best an imperfect substitute for a national monetary policy.
EMU membership always increases employment variability to a large extent.
Equilibrium indexation in the EMU leads to lower social welfare than nominal wage
rigidity, because decentralised wage setters choose more indexation than is socially eﬃ-
cient: they do not take into account that indexation increases price variability. Table 5
shows that socially optimal indexation levels are much lower than the equilibrium levels
(see Appendix C for the formulas).
Table 6 compares the social losses (gross of indexation costs) under socially optimal
indexation and non-indexation. The table shows that a move to indexation in the EMU
is an imperfect substitute for a national monetary policy in this case, too: the social
loss under socially optimal indexation in the EMU is larger than the loss without index-
ation outside the EMU. The welfare diﬀerences between socially optimal indexation and
non-indexation are small inside the EMU compared to the welfare diﬀerences between
indexation and non-indexation for individual wage setters acting in a decentralised way
(see Table 3). So, it is much less probable that EMU membership will entail a move from
non-indexation to indexation if decisions are centralised rather than decentralised. The
even smaller diﬀerences in welfare between socially optimal indexation and non-indexation
outside the EMU explain why centralised decisions are likely to rule out indexation in this
case.
16Variances Inside Outside
NI SO NI - SO NI SO NI - SO
σ1 = σ2 =1 3.21 3.02 0.19 1.273 1.265 7.7×10−3
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 4.91 4.69 0.22 1.448 1.446 2.0×10−3
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 4.71 4.34 0.37 1.666 1.666 2.0×10−5
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 3.21 3.02 0.19 2.00 1.92 0.08
NI = non indexation, SO = socially optimal indexation
Table 6: The social loss with socially optimal indexation and non-indexation (β =0 .5,
λ =1 ,a n dγ =1 )
6 EMU membership and contract length
Do the results on indexation carry over to other ways of modelling nominal wage ﬂexibil-
ity? An alternative is to discard the possibility of indexation and let contracts determine
only a nominal wage, but instead endogenise contract length. The assumption is then
that uncertainty is increasing over time, so that optimal contract length reﬂects a trade-
oﬀ between contract costs on one hand and employment and real wage variability on the
other.
Our model can easily be adapted in this way. We change to a continuous-time for-
mulation and assume shocks to follow Wiener processes, which are the continous-time
analogues of random walks. The expected values of the shocks are zero, but the variances
increase over time. For example, the conditional forecast variance evaluated at time T
of the supply shock at the future time t is Va r T(θt)=( t − T)σ2
θ,w h e r eσ2
θ is now the
instantaneous variance.
Outside the EMU, the national central bank is assumed to set it policy instrument
so as to minimise the expectation of the loss function (8) at each point of time. This
assumption captures that monetary policy is adjusted much more frequently than wages.
The outcome is a policy response function like (11), but which now applies at each instant.
Wage setters have the same preferences over employment, the real consumption wage
and the CPI as in Section 2, but they now incur a cost C each time a new contract is
concluded. The total loss for a wage setter over a contract period is the sum of the contract
cost and the squared deviations from the employment, real wage and CPI goals. Each
wage setter’s objective is now to choose contract length to minimise the total expected
loss over a relevant time horizon. If we set the discount rate to zero and again take the
CPI level as exogenous for each wage setter, this is equivalent to minimising the expected


















Choosing xi to minimize (14) subject to (11) and the continous-time versions of (2), (3),


























γE0[(wi(xi) − pc(xi) − φ)
2]=0 .
Contract length is chosen so that the cost sa v i n g sp e ru n i to ft i m eo fl e n g t h e n i n gt h e
contract period balances the loss from larger employment and real wage ﬂuctuations at
the margin. Assuming symmetry and synchronisation of contract periods, contract length
outside the EMU, xO, can be solved out as (see Appendix D)
x
O =




v + V σ2
ξ
,
where S =( H0β − (1 − β))
2 + γ (α − (a(1 − α)+β (1 − a))H0)
2, U =( 1 + K0β)
2 +
γ (α(1 − a)+( a(1 − α)+β (1 − a))K0)
2,a n dV = β
2 +γ (a(1 − α)+β (1 − a))
2.C o n -
tract length is increasing in the contract cost and decreasing in the (instantaneous) vari-
ances of the shocks.
Proceeding as above, we can derive contract length inside the EMU as:
x
I =
v u u u t














Again contract length is increasing in the contract cost. It is decreasing in the (instanta-
nous) variances of both supply and demand shocks.
The ratio between the contract length outside and inside the EMU can be written:
xO
xI =







1+γα2 (1 − a)
2´
σ1
S + Uσ1 + V σ2
. (15)
In general, it is not clear whether this ratio is larger or smaller than unity. We resort
again to numerical examples. Table 7 shows that wage contracts are shorter inside than
outside the EMU in all our cases.
18Variances λ =1 λ =2 λ =3
σ1 = σ2 =1 2.85 2.71 2.53
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 3.59 3.39 3.13
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 3.54 3.32 3.04
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 1.77 1.72 1.64
Table 7: The ratio between contract length outside and inside the EMU (β =0 .5, and
γ =1 )
6.2 Social welfare
As before, we also examine the social welfare consequences of increased nominal wage
ﬂexibility in the case of EMU membership. We do this for a time period that coincides
with the contract length chosen outside the EMU. First, we compute the macroeconomic
variability and the social loss (gross of contract costs) outside and inside the EMU, re-
spectively, under the assumption that the contract length outside the EMU is also chosen
inside, so that there is no endogenous adjustment of contract length. Second, we evalu-
ate macroeconomic variability in the EMU under the assumption that wage setters then
choose their desired contract length.
In Table 8, the ﬁrst two columns give the macroeconomic outcomes inside the EMU
when there is no adjustment of contract length. The third and fourth columns give the
outcomes inside the EMU when there is such an adjustment. The measurement unit
for the outcome variables is the contract cost, which we have normalised to unity. The
computations formulas are given in Appendix D.
Employment, real consumption wage and price variability, and hence the social loss,
are always larger inside than outside the EMU in the table. An adjustment of contract
length in the EMU always reduces employment and real wage variability, but increases
price variability. As in the indexation case, the increase in nominal wage ﬂexibility in the
EMU reduces social welfare with the λ:s and γ:s shown in the table, because the negative
eﬀects on price variability dominate the positive eﬀects on employment and real wage
variability. As before, this result is reversed for low λ:s or high γ:s. The cut-oﬀ values for
λ below which the adjustment of contract length leads to a reduction in the (gross) social
loss are 0.68 (equal variances for supply and demand shocks), 0.64 (large supply shocks),
and 0.71 (large demand shocks). The cut-oﬀ values for γ are 2.70 (equal variances for
supply and demand shocks), 2.63 (large supply shocks), and 2.81 (large demand shocks).
19Variances Inside, NA Inside A Outside
λ =1 λ =2 λ =1 λ =2 λ =1 λ =2
Employment variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 1.99 1.90 1.05 1.01 0.53 0.67
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 4.27 4.03 2.18 2.07 1.03 1.33
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 2.82 2.65 1.44 1.36 0.49 0.67
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 1.24 1.20 0.79 0.78 0.58 0.66
CPI variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.85 0.81 2.57 2.42 0.47 0.33
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 2.91 2.75 7.66 7.22 0.97 0.67
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 0.72 0.68 2.79 2.61 0.51 0.33
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 0.53 0.51 1.36 1.29 0.42 0.33
Real consumption variability
σ1 = σ2 =1 0.85 0.81 0.64 0.61 0.47 0.33
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 2.91 2.75 1.93 1.83 0.97 0.67
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.51 0.33
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 0.53 0.51 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.34
The social loss
σ1 = σ2 =1 3.70 4.34 4.23 6.46 1.47 1.67
σ1 = σ2 =1 /2 10.10 12.20 11.78 17.36 2.97 2.13
σ1 =2 , σ2 =1 4.27 4.68 4.86 7.17 1.51 1.67
σ1 =1 , σ2 =2 2.31 2.75 2.57 3.77 1.42 1.67
NA = non-adjustment of contract length, A = adjustment of contract length
Table 8: Macroeconomic variability and social loss (β =0 .5, and γ =1 )
7 Discussion
It is a commonly believed that membership in a monetary union like the EMU tends to
increase macroeconomic variability. We show that if this is the case, then nominal wage
ﬂexibility is likely to increase with monetary union membership. It could lead to a move
from non-indexation to indexation. Similarly, contract length may be shortened.
More ﬂexible nominal wages reduce the variability of employment and the real con-
sumption wage, but at a cost of more price variability. Hence, increased nominal wage
ﬂexibility in a monetary union might reduce social welfare. If this is not to occur, the rel-
ative weight of inﬂation versus employment in the social welfare function must be below
unity (0.6-0.7) or the relative weight of the real consumption wage considerably above
unity (2.5-2.8). But also then, increased nominal wage ﬂexibility in a monetary union
is a very imperfect substitute for a national monetary policy, mainly because it oﬀsets
the tendency to increased employment variability only partially. In all our examples, the
socially optimal degree of indexation is much lower than equilibrium indexation. Hence,
20wage indexation is more likely if indexation decisions are taken in a decentralised than in
a centralised fashion.
As to possible extensions, an obvious drawback of our model concerns the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. We have focused exclusively on the exchange rate channel
of monetary policy in the Krugman-Obstfeld textbook tradition (Krugman and Obstfeld,
2000) and neglected the interest rate channel. To elaborate also the latter channel is a
natural next step.
We have assumed the same weight on inﬂation in the preference functions of the
central bank and society. An alternative would be to assume more inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni nt h e
central bank’s preference function than in the social welfare function. Some experimenting
suggests, however, that such modiﬁcations would not change the results substantially.
But a deeper analysis requires that the welfare functions are derived from well-speciﬁed
preferences of the individual agents.
An extended analysis should analyse the interaction between diﬀerent economies. This
would require an explicit modelling of both symmetric and asymmetric shocks. Such an
analysis would be more complex and is likely to result in multiple indexation equilibria
not only outside the monetary union, but also inside.
Our analysis shares the feature with the earlier literature that indexation is not subject
to downward nominal rigidity: indexation is symmetric and could lead to both higher and
lower wage increases than in the base contract. An alternative is to allow for asymmetric
indexation, i.e. index clauses that are triggered only when inﬂation is above a certain
threshold. This is likely to result in contracts with a lower base wage and higher indexation
than in our analysis, allowing wage setters to use the indexation clauses symmetrically
to achieve both upward and downward ﬂexibility in this case as well (see Cover and Van
Hoose, 2002).
It might also be worthwhile to introduce pricing-to-market assumptions, according to
which there is only a partial pass-through of exchange rate changes to import prices in
local currency (see e.g. Lane, 2001; or Obstfeld, 2002). This would reconcile the empir-
ical ﬁndings that exchange rate shocks are not very important for output and inﬂation
varaibility, although they are the main determinant of exchange rate volatility according
to several studies.
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A Indexation without indexation costs
A.1 The central bank’s decision rule
In (11) we have K =( −(1 − b)(1− αb)β − λα((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))(1 − a))/V and
H=(αλ((1 − α)a + β (1 − a)) + β (1 − b)(1− β − αb))/V ,w h e r eV =( 1 − b)
2 β
2 +
λ((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))
2.0≤ b ≤ 1a n d0< β ≤ 1a l w a y si m p l yt h a tK<0. b =0a n d
0 < β ≤ 1a l w a y si m p l yH>0. 0 ≤ b ≤ 1a n d0< β ≤ 1i m p l yH>0 for the parameter
values we subsequently use.
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D((1 − a)(1− β) − β (1 − a)H)Z
´
/T, B = abE/T +
³√






Fβ (1 − a)Z
´
/T, T = a + β (1 − a),
D = (((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))H − α)
2, E = (((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))K + α(1 − a))
2, F =
((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))
2 and Z = a + β (1 − a) − abα.
A.3 The b =1equilibrium
Using equations (6), (7), (9), (10), (11) and wi0 = w0 = pe
c + φ + le/(γ (1 − a)), which
follows from the FOC for wi0, we can derive that:
pc =
(((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))H − α)
a + β (1 − a) − abα
θ +
(((1 − α)a + β (1 − a))K + α(1 − a))
a + β (1 − a) − abα
v
+
(1 − α)a + β (1 − a)
a + β (1 − a) − abα
ξ. (A1)
When b =1 ,H = α/((1 − α)a + β (1 − a)) and K=−α(1 − a)/((1 − α)a + β (1 − a)).
Substituting these expressions into (A1) gives pc = ξ.
B I n d e x a t i o ni nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs






,w h e r eM = I, O denotes EMU membership and non-membership,
respectively, is obtained by evaluating the expectation of (4) with bi = b =0 .T oe v a l u a t e






the optimal degree of indexation in this case by minimising the expectation of (4) when
b =0 .I ti s :
bi =
(1 − a)(1− β)+γα(1 − a)
2 +( 1− a)
2 σ1 + γα(1 − a)
4 σ1
α + γα(1 − a)
2 + α(1 − a)
2 σ1 + γα(1 − a)
4 σ1
, (B2)
inside the EMU. Outside the EMU it is obtained by setting b = 0 in (13). The expected
losses are obtained by setting bi equal to these values and b =0 .
The expected loss for wage setter i when he/she does not index, but others are expected





, is computed by setting bi =0a n db equal to the lowest value that is
a solution to (13) when bi = b in the expectation of (4). The expected loss for wage setter






by setting bi = b equal to the lowest value that is a solution to (13). All expected losses
are calculated under the assumption that E (p2
c) is exogenous.


























The exact expressions are reported in Calmfors and Johansson (2002).
C Socially optimal indexation
Minimising the expectation of (4) w.r.t b subject to (2), (3), (6), (9), (10), and a ﬁxed
exchange rate gives the socially optimal indexation in the EMU as:
b =
1



















Minimising the expectation of(4) w.r.t b subject to (2), (3), (6), (7), (9), (10) and
(11) gives the socially optimal indexation outside the EMU as:
b =








c D + b Eσ1 + b Fσ2
−








c D + b Eσ1 + b Fσ2
σ1, (C2)






+(1− β − βH)(β (1 − b)ZdH/db), b C = β
2√
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√
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´
,
b F = β









and L = aαF.
D Contract length
We assume that wage contracts are synchronised at time t = 0, so that there is no
staggering and we obtain a symmetric equilibrium. The FOC for the optimal wage during



















E0 ((wi(0) − pc − φ))dt =0 .
26Using that θ(0) = v(0) = ξ (0) = 0, we can derive that:
w(0) = wi(0) =
1










(H0β − (1 − β))
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where H0 and K0 are obtained from H and K in (11) by setting b =0 . E x p e c t e dC P I















(a + β (1 − a))
2 ,
where D, E and F are obtained from Appendix A.2 by setting b =0 .






















θ + α2 (1 − a)
2 tσ2
v
(a + β (1 − a))
2 .
The expected gross social losses from macroeconomic variability when actual con-
tract length both outside and inside the EMU = the optimal contract length for a local





































(w(0) − pc(t) − φ)
2i
dt.
The expected gross social loss inside the EMU over the period xO when wage setters
































(w(0) − pc(t) − φ)
2i
dt.
27In Table 8, the social losses for each shock conﬁguration and inﬂation weight are measured
for a time period that equals the contract period outside the EMU in this case. Hence,
social losses can be compared for a given shock conﬁguration and a given inﬂation weight
only, but not across shock conﬁgurations and inﬂation weights. Calmfors and Johansson
(2002) report the computation formulas.
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